PL EN


2008 | 7 | 71-87
Article title

PERSONAL IDENTITY AS DETERMINED BY A SELF WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE (Ja z pierwszoosobowa perspektywa jako wyznacznik tozsamosci osobowej)

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Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
In this article the author presents a theory of personal identity (PI) that appeals both to Lynne Baker's approach and to Antonio Damasio's neurophilosophical theory. He discusses Damasio's theory of self relevant to the problem of PI (from his work The Feeling of What Happens) and Baker's description of first-person phenomena. Her distinction between making and attributing first-person reference and critical remarks related to her conception that have appeared are also pointed out. Finally, taking into account ontogenetic development of a human being, the author sketches a theory of PI according to which PI is determined by a so-called self with a first-person perspective. He uses here Ingarden's notion of a core/coreless object.
Year
Issue
7
Pages
71-87
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • T. Kakol, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Instytut Filozofii Socjologii i Dziennikarstwa, Zaklad Filozofii Wspólczesnej, ul. Bielanska 5, 80-851 Gdansk, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA064121
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.54addb1a-9991-34d6-b27f-f4cc093c52b7
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