Epistemocentryzm jako epistemologiczna przeszkoda nauk społecznych
Epistemocentrism as an Epistemological Obstacle in the Social Sciences
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Rationality, intersubjectivity, and objectivity have been conceived as primary epistemological categories from the begining of modern epoch. They characterize knowledge or subjects of knowledge, or even their activity - cognition. Epistemocentrism - in P. Bourdieu view typical to modern thinking - and supporting it epistemological fundamentalism are nothing else but limitation of the meaning of these categories. In the bygone times, epistemocentrism was useful, but now is a simply anachronism in the face of modern roles of knowledge in societies and in the face of growing progress of social sciences. Today, science and its contribution in the social worlds are not the same as once. Therefore, the need arises for revision of epistemocentrism as well as for the fulfillment of the 'epistemological gap' which emerged from collapse of epistemological fundamentalism. I think that there is a room for the new 'philosophical partition of reality' emancipated from Cartesian despotism of ego cogito and recovering intuitional insights in the social life of the ancient thinkers as Aristotle. In the paper, I concentrate on thesis that epistemocentrism is an epistemological obstacle in the social sciences and source of their crises.
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