VETO-ACTORS AND VETO-PLAYERS AS A MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR YOUNG DEMOCRACIES (Weto-aktorzy i weto-gracze jako model konstytucyjnego projektowania dla mlodych demokracji)
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The article presents a proposal for a model of constitutional design going beyond the traditional discourse about presidential and parliamentary form of government. The proposal is addressed only to young democracies which have come out of dictatorship. The model is designed to help consolidate democracy by making it capable of implementing the necessary reforms and, above all, to protect democracy against its transformation into autocracy. Firstly, the model is based mostly on the experience of democratic transition in the countries of Latin America, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asia of the recent 30 years. Secondly, its basic assumptions result — in the author's view — from theoretical reflections of the following scholars: Matthew Soberg Shugart, John Carey, George Tsebelis and Mathew McCubbins. The proposed paradigm of constitutional design has not been based on big patterns of presidential or parliamentary systems, because in 73% countries involved in transformation, their application has not resulted in a consolidated democracy but in hybrid (autocratic-democratic) regimes. Its status is a consequence of the significance for young democracies of the detailed designing of the system of bodies on which the right of veto may be conferred (institutional veto-actors and partisan veto-players), whose consent will be needed in order to effect changes in politics. The model shows the importance and mutual connections of their mechanism, and they may be used to exert influence on political situation in the State.
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