THE EPIPHENOMENALISM OBJECTION AS AN EXTERNAL CRITICISM OF ANOMALOUS MONISM (Zarzut epifenomenalizmu jako zarzut zewnetrzny wzgledem monizmu anomalnego)
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The paper is a critical reaction to M. Grygianiec's discussion of the status of the epiphenonemalism objection to anomalous monism. Grygianiec argues that the objection does not arise for Davidson if one takes his nominalism seriously. I show that Grygianiec construes the epiphenomenalist charge as an internal one. I argue that it can be viewed as an external objection to anomalism monism, moreover one that is justified, adequate and charitable. I distinguish two interpretations of the objection and show that an appeal to charity can explain why an apparently inadequate form of the objection is often preferred.
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