One of the striking features of Davidson's account of action individuation is the internalization of actions to the domain of bodily movements. I reconstruct Davidson's arguments for that claim as applying mainly against naive externalism (according to which actions are simple events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body) but also against externalist moderationism (according to which actions are complex events, extending in time and space beyond the agent's body). I show that the debate between Davidson's internalist minimalism and externalist moderationism is at a standstill. Externalist moderationism is better at explaining some of the claims we are prepared to make about actions (the temporal problem) while internalist minimalism is better at capturing some deeper intuitions about actions. I argue that one can use the old distinction between process and product as applied to agency to help get out of the impasse and restore healthy externalist intuitions.
Katarzyna Paprzycka, Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
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