This article focuses on Patočka’s conception of “negative Platonism”; it proceeds from Patočka’s study of the same name and looks to several other texts which have originated in connection with that study. First of all, it offers a brief résumé of the key points of Patočka’s conception (the experience of freedom, the conception of idea, the relation between idea and objecthood). Next, it summarises and comments on the main thoughts of Rezek’s, Kouba‘s and Hejdánek’s reflections and critiques of the conception (with a look at some other interpretations). With their help, the inner contradiction of Patočka’s conception is demonstrated, in which idea should remain purely negative, and yet be a calling to the world, enabling true discourse about beings. In conclusion the author of the paper puts forward the suggestion that it was this contradictory nature that led Patočka to abandon his “negative Platonism”.