THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF A PERSON FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEUROSCIENCES (Status ontyczny osoby z perspektywy neuronauk)
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Contemporary inquiry of the ontological status of a person is a matter of both philosophy and neurosciences. This article examines the question of persons ontology from two interconnected perspectives. The first one is a philosophical perspective represented by J. Searle, T. Nagel, D. Dennett and T. Metzinger; the other one is the perspective of the neuroscientific researches. The neuroscientific studies are founded on the data which are taken from the results of psychosurgical operations and of the brain tissue transplantations. The question of preservation and alteration of personal identity is one of the central subjects of further analysis and therapy which follow the mentioned medical operations. Both adherents and opponents of such surgical operations refer to the same concepts; however, they represent different understanding of the terms: 'numerical' or 'qualitative identity' of the person and his or her brain. I conclude that a comprehensive analysis of personal identity requires both philosophical and scientific approach, which would result in a new kind of neurophilosophy, similar to that what G. Northoff and A. Heinzel call 'the First-Person Neuroscience'.
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