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2011 | 59 | 7, Special No: Fenomenologie tělesnosti | 47-68

Article title

Subjektivní pohyb těla a svět : Poznámky o fenomenologii a metafyzice tělesnosti v reflexích Jana Patočky



Title variants

Subjective Movement of the Body and the World

Languages of publication



„The body as a subject – this paradox which is a phenomenon at the same time,“ writes Patočka in the article entitled „Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Movement“. In this article, Patočka develops the given paradox on the phenomenological basis, presenting the theses concerning the non-objectifiable foundation of the constitution of the world and its givenness. According to Patočka, the world conforms, in a certain sense, to the intentions of subjective movement. Thus, the subjective movement of the body and the movement of the apparition of the world, i.e. the entry of the invisible to the realm of the apparition, correspond to each other. In different contexts, Patočka goes even further and interprets the subjective movement of the body from the perspective of vital structures. The primary „feeling“ of finitude takes place in the instinctive-affective motricity of the body, in the so-called first movement of existence. It is here, in the sensory perception and affectivity, below the threshold of consciousness and understanding of being that the resonance with the world takes place, as well as the perception of this world as a strange and destructive power. In this sense, it is already the body and its anxiety rather than the anticipation of death in the understanding of being that represents the basis of our feeling of finitude.


  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic


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Publication order reference


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