PL EN


2008 | 15 | 3 | 283-294
Article title

SWIMMING UPSTREAM - PROBLEMS FOR SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF REASONS

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In an account of what we might call fundamental practical normativity, it is helpful, the author thinks, to distinguish between the normativity of reasons and that of rationality. But when we do so the question of the relation between these two realms arises: are these two independent kinds of normativity? Can we account for the normativity of rationality in terms of the normativity of reasons? Or is it the other way around; is rationality explanatorily prior to reasons? This paper discusses a positive answer to the last of these questions. In a number of articles, as well as in his first book, Michael Smith has argued that the nature of reasons can be accounted for in terms of ideal rationality. The author argues that Smith is unsuccessful in his analysis of normative reasons in terms of full rationality, and that the failure of his analysis leaves his closely related argument for normative judgement internalism unconvincing.
Contributors
  • J. B. Hoej, for postal address contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08SKAAAA05009521
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.6691521c-9d5c-3b2b-b3b2-012e5df1f5e1
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