SWIMMING UPSTREAM - PROBLEMS FOR SMITH'S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURE OF REASONS

• Authors: Hoej J. B.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In an account of what we might call fundamental practical normativity, it is helpful, the author thinks, to distinguish between the normativity of reasons and that of rationality. But when we do so the question of the relation between these two realms arises: are these two independent kinds of normativity? Can we account for the normativity of rationality in terms of the normativity of reasons? Or is it the other way around; is rationality explanatorily prior to reasons? This paper discusses a positive answer to the last of these questions. In a number of articles, as well as in his first book, Michael Smith has argued that the nature of reasons can be accounted for in terms of ideal rationality. The author argues that Smith is unsuccessful in his analysis of normative reasons in terms of full rationality, and that the failure of his analysis leaves his closely related argument for normative judgement internalism unconvincing.

Keywords

EN

ACTING FOR A REASON; IRRATIONALITY; NORMATIVE REASONS; NORMATIVITY; PRACTICAL REASONS; RATIONALITY

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 283-294
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Hoej J. B.

• J. B. Hoej, for postal address contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08SKAAAA05009521