PL EN


2010 | 12 | 167-182
Article title

SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM (Semantyczne zalozenia sceptycyzmu kartezjanskiego)

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The paper purports to show that in order to formulate the hypothesis that all our beliefs are collectively false - which is taken to be the core of Cartesian skepticism - one must accept the presumption that semantic properties of subject's beliefs locally supervene on 'internal' properties of said subject. In order to show that the responses to skepticism from semantic externalism, i.e. those formulated by Putnam and Davidson, are analyzed. It is argued that even though these arguments are controversial they indicate that Cartesian skeptic must assume that subject beliefs' semantic properties can remain the same in different surroundings, which is exactly what the supervenience thesis amounts to. Finally, it is pointed out that the skepticism introduced by Kripke in his discussion of rule-following is indeed more radical than traditional, Cartesian one, as the former denies the very thesis that the latter must assume.
Year
Issue
12
Pages
167-182
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Krzysztof Poslajko, Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11PLAAAA10069
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.6b801601-740b-3af6-8ccf-0671f5e44143
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