PL EN


2005 | 52 | 3 | 275-288
Article title

Social-insurance pension systems as public goods

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
HU
Abstracts
EN
The study shows how the present social-security pension systems, assuming methodological individualism and employing the apparatus of repeated games, are in a multiple prisoner's dilemma situation. The study analyses this by formulating and proving three propositions: the dilemmas of demography, contribution payments, and the political class. These are confirmed using the so-called Selten thesis of repeated-game theory.
Year
Volume
52
Issue
3
Pages
275-288
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • J. Meszaros, no address given, contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07HUAAAA02956016
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.749c59d1-2dc7-3f94-9cd2-05b85a0d5719
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