Social-insurance pension systems as public goods

• Authors: Meszaros J.
• Languages of publication: HU

Abstracts

EN

The study shows how the present social-security pension systems, assuming methodological individualism and employing the apparatus of repeated games, are in a multiple prisoner's dilemma situation. The study analyses this by formulating and proving three propositions: the dilemmas of demography, contribution payments, and the political class. These are confirmed using the so-called Selten thesis of repeated-game theory.

Keywords

EN

GAME THEORY; PENSION SYSTEMS; SOCIAL SECURITY

Discipline

• ECONOMICS: ECONOMICS

• Publisher: Committee for Economic Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
• Year: 2005
• Volume: 52
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 275-288
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Meszaros J.

• J. Meszaros, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07HUAAAA02956016