EN
This article is devoted to the problems of the philosophy of the ego which Józef Tischner developed in the early 1970s, especially in his dissertation, 'The Phenomenology of the Egological Conscience'. The main challenge of his early papers was to examine the original experience of the self as a value, or as a 'personal ego', making a choice between the opposite groups of positive and negative values against the background of 'horizontal values', arranged according to the hierarchy described by Max Scheler. The authoress examines the relationship between different levels of the egological experience: the somatic ego, the cognitive ego and the personal ego, mentioned above. The article presented also discusses the Hegelian relationship between hermeneutical comprehension and phenomenological cognition in Tischner's early book. She finds his theory of the self as a surmounting of the formalistic consequences of Heideggerian 'Dasein' and the inconsistencies of the Husserlian, Schelerian and Ingardenian concept of the ego. It is also susceptible to the objections of analytical philosophy and Neopositivism against Hegelian metaphysics and Husserlian phenomenology and this is its main imperfection. However, it is probably the most interesting modern continuation of the Augustinian current in anthropology.