This article aims to reconstruct Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation as a model of practical rationality. The concept of strong evaluation offers an attractive alternative to proceduralism, whether of a utilitarian or Kantian type, because it enables specific moral claims to be legitimised in the life of a person, and their justification does not abstract from the motivation of the person who lives in harmony with these standards. The sense of the concept of strong evaluation consists in its ability to highlight the all-transcending nature of values and evaluation in the real life. We will seek a response to the question of whether Taylor’s interpretation of the concept of strong evaluation is sufficiently broad as to cover the three relevant components of ethics: the question of values, moral norms and moral evaluation. With respect to this question we will also give an overview of Laitinen’s reinterpretation of this concept which, on the view of the author, illuminates the inner relations between the subject and morality and, by a treatment of the nature of moral norms in concepts or reasons for actions (as distinguished from the Kantian grounding of morality), points to the complementary nature of values and moral norms.