The Argument of the Lesser Evil

• Authors: Lukaszuk M.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

This paper is an attempt to justify the lesser evil argument as it has been raised and undermined by Robert Pilat in his latest book on wrongdoing and redressing of evil. However, instead of using ethical terms as Pilat does, the author makes use of decision theory, i.e. 'maximin' rule, to demonstrate that common thinking of the lesser evil is far more justifiable than e.g. Pilat would concede.

Keywords

EN

LESSER EVIL ARGUMENT

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 2(58)
• Pages: 83-95
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Lukaszuk M.

• M. Lukaszuk, c/o Szkola Nauk Spolecznych przy Instytucie Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, ul. Nowy Swiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07PLAAAA02414999