PL EN


2007 | 6 | 5-23
Article title

DOES EPISTEMIC SUBJECTIVITY HAVE MORAL IMPORT?

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Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
We start from the basics: there is a meaning of the notion of epistemic subject under which it is not an object at all. This statement does not lead to dualism of substance; it fits with any sort of non-reductionism. What follows is that we assume certain subjects that are not objects, hence entities that we can't build direct predicative statements about. Whatever we can say about them comes indirectly, from the influence subjects have on certain objects. Hence, loosely speaking, subjectivity can be viewed as a feature of certain ontological entities (objects), such as persons. But an ontology of pure subjects is possible, based on the indirect influences they have. Such ontology of subjects that are not objects allows us to have subjects consistently as a part, though a very specific one, of the ontological furniture of the world. The author also claims that subjectivity is what, prima facie, deserves a moral standing though only certain additional capacities make a being a moral patient.
Year
Issue
6
Pages
5-23
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • P. Boltuc, University of Illinois, Springfield, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08PLAAAA04668919
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.8079f8f4-c016-34d7-8bc9-b3f90f03319e
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