DOES EPISTEMIC SUBJECTIVITY HAVE MORAL IMPORT?

• Authors: Boltuc P.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

We start from the basics: there is a meaning of the notion of epistemic subject under which it is not an object at all. This statement does not lead to dualism of substance; it fits with any sort of non-reductionism. What follows is that we assume certain subjects that are not objects, hence entities that we can't build direct predicative statements about. Whatever we can say about them comes indirectly, from the influence subjects have on certain objects. Hence, loosely speaking, subjectivity can be viewed as a feature of certain ontological entities (objects), such as persons. But an ontology of pure subjects is possible, based on the indirect influences they have. Such ontology of subjects that are not objects allows us to have subjects consistently as a part, though a very specific one, of the ontological furniture of the world. The author also claims that subjectivity is what, prima facie, deserves a moral standing though only certain additional capacities make a being a moral patient.

Keywords

EN

CONSCIOUSNESS; EPISTEMIC SUBJECT'S ONTOLOGY; NON-REDUCTIONISM; SUBJECT THAT IS NOT AN OBJECT; SUBJECTIVITY

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Journal: Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
• Year: 2007
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 5-23
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Boltuc P.

• P. Boltuc, University of Illinois, Springfield, USA

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08PLAAAA04668919