Title variants
Languages of publication
Abstracts
Causal overdetermination - i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z - has been long considered as a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as 'spoils to the victor'. The author shows how, if we modify Lewis' account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination.
Discipline
Year
Volume
Issue
Pages
461-476
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
- Dana Goswick, Philosophy Department, The University of Melbourne, Old Quad Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11SKAAAA094412
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.809a33cf-642d-3023-8d96-d9e04f699a06