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Abstracts
We compare the welfare effects of government credit subsidies and guarantees in transition and post-transition economies in the conditions of asymmetric information. We show that the guarantees and subsidies targeted to low risk borrowers decrease efficiency while those targeted to high risk borrowers increase efficiency both in transition and post-transition economies. The uniform non-targeted guarantees improve welfare. The uniform subsidies may be used to improve welfare in the economy subjected to credit rationing, but they do not have any effect on the size of collateral required in post-transition economy.
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Volume
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Pages
383-398
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
- K. Janda, Ustav slovenskej a svetovej ekonomiky SAV, Sancová 56, 811 05 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic
References
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Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06SKAAAA00882116
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.83cd7adf-e2e4-31f4-a3a7-b3f76b7c55cb