Wittgenstein o istote: praktické rozriešenie skeptických pochybností

• Authors: Mariana Szapuová

Title variants

EN

Wittgenstein on Certainty: A Practical Solution of Sceptical Doubts

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

The aim of this article is to investigate Wittgenstein’s views on doubt and certainty as they are expressed in his work On Certainty in the context of discussions about scepticism. I begin with a critical analysis of the interpretational framework according to which Wittgenstein’s notes amount to the kind of anti-sceptical strategy which demonstrates the meaninglessness of sceptical assertions as flowing from an abuse of language. I note the context of Wittgenstein’s notes and I evaluate the strong and weak sides of the linguistic interpretation. Then I adumbrate the possibility of an alternative interpretation of these notes. Firstly, I offer a characterisation of the “sceptical problem” and I defend the thesis that Wittgenstein’s notes can be read as a reaction to the sceptical problem understood as a challenge which calls for the justification of claims to knowledge as defined by the tripartite definition. In the second part of the article I distinguish several types of reaction to the sceptical problem, and I argue in favour of the view that Wittgenstein’s stance on the question can be best characterised as a reaction to the sceptical challenge which provides a “practical solution” to sceptical doubts. scepticism, anti-sceptical strategy, knowledge, Wittgenstein, certainty, action

Keywords

EN

scepticism; anti-sceptical strategy; knowledge; Wittgenstein; certainty; action

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 725-741
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Mariana  Szapuová

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic