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2006 | 13 | 2 | 161-169
Article title

THINKING REEDS AND THE IDEAL OF REASON: OUTLINE OF A NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Pascal described human beings as 'thinking reeds', weak in flesh but magnificent in mind. While it is a poetic image, it is also an ambivalent one and may suggest inappropriately Dualist view of human nature. It is important to realize that not only we are thinking reeds but that we are thinking because we are reeds. In fact, rationality is reed-like itself, very much of a kind with the rest of human nature. It is now more than two and half centuries since David Hume first pointed out the lack of an argument that would fully justify claims about matters of fact. Being neither made evident by our observations nor arising out of the mere consideration of relations of ideas, claims such as that turkey will be fed dinner tomorrow - rather that being had for dinner (to use Russel's famous example) have remained problematic ever since. Many attempts have been made to show something of the beauty and certainty of reasoning about relations of ideas could be recaptured in our dealings with matters of fact, but all attempts have remained mere shadows of what we tried to grasp. Hume's argument stands. An infinite being might watch countless sunsets and yet should witness each new sunrise with surprise, always withholding its judgment regarding what will follow.
Contributors
  • K. Talmont-Kaminski, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej w Lublinie, Instytut Filozofii, pl. M. Curie-Sklodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06SKAAAA01242829
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.8ade34a6-acac-372e-89b2-6d0e239ab5a2
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