DEDUCTIVISM IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOGIC

• Authors: Jacquette Dale
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Deductivism is explained and defended. The thesis holds that logic generally, both formal and informal, is primarily concerned with the normative distinction between good and bad reasoning, and interprets good reasoning as minimally deductively valid inference. If deductivism is true, then it follows that all fallacies of reasoning, including the so-called informal or rhetorical fallacies, are deductively invalid. Deductivism as an ideology nevertheless cuts across the distinction between formal and informal logic. To defend deductivism against potential counterexamples, it is necessary to show that common fallacies are reconstructible as deductively invalid inferences. The present essay undertakes the groundwork of such a defense by arguing that even inductive argumentation, including inductive fallacies, along with circular reasoning, can be interpreted deductively. A large selection of other informal fallacies are also reconstructed as explicit deductive invalidities following a pattern that can be used to bring other fallacies under the deductivist umbrella.

Keywords

EN

ARGUMENTATION; CIRCULAR REASONING; DEDUCTIVE VALIDITY; DEDUCTIVISM; FALLACY; FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOGIC; INDUCTIVE REASONING; INFORMAL (RHETORICAL) FALLACY; PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC; VALIDITY

Discipline

• LIBRARY_&_INFORMATION_SCIENCE: LIBRARY & INFORMATION SCIENCE

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
• Year: 2009
• Issue: 16(29)
• Pages: 189-216
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Jacquette Dale

• Dale Jacquette, University of Bern, Langgassstrasse 49a, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

11PLAAAA10158