DEFENCELESSNESS AND INCENTIVE IN THE RELATION BETWEEN RETAIL CHAINS AND THEIR SUPPLIERS. A CAUSAL ANALYSIS FROM THE SUPPLIERS' POINT OF VIEW (Hungarian title - below)
Languages of publication
(Title in Hungarian - 'Kiszolgaltatottsag es osztonzo ero a kiskereskedelmi lancok es beszallitoik kapcsolataban. Oksagi elemzes beszallitoi szemszogbol'). The global concentration in retailing has left the large retail chains in a stronger bargaining position. They have more and more scope to draw up contracts with their suppliers that suit themselves. This can be observed in Hungary as well. At the same time, the impact of tough conditions on suppliers is not evident. Some have supposed that the situation prompts suppliers to raise their efficiency and eventually enhance their competitiveness. Others argue that some contracting routines - found in practice in Hungary, although forbidden by the Trade Act that came into force on June 1, 2006 - distort the competition among retail chains and curb the development opportunities for suppliers. The study examines the relations and contracting routine between large retail chains present in Hungary and their suppliers, using multiple-variable. The database is drawn from a questionnaire survey conducted in 2007 with 392 executives of producers and wholesalers in the food processing industry. The findings show that the buying muscle of the retail chains is faced more frequently by companies of a greater size with higher revenues and faster development. But it could not be verified by the survey results that suppliers are more inspired to innovate by retail chains than by other types of retail company.
Publication order reference
CEJSH db identifier