PL EN


2009 | 2 | 106-119
Article title

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF DEDUCTION (Transtsendental'ny argument i problema deduktsii)

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
UK
Abstracts
EN
The need to fully realize the interpretation of Kant's notion of transcendence requires critical attitude to the modern debate regarding this notion between the representatives of analytic philosophy (Wittgenstein, Quine, Strawson). Within analytic tradition, the notion of transcendence implies the transformation of the conditions of the possibility of logic, language, and empirical science into formal self-referential structure. The authenticity of the interpretation of Kant's concept of transcendence and the transcendental argument is further supported by: 1) understanding the impossibility of its excessive convergence with the notion of a priori, 2) understanding of the transcendence as self-representative complex structure which includes the coordination between the conditions of genesis and functioning of empirical knowledge and conditions of the exclusion of intellectual alternatives on the levels of logical analysis and empirical knowledge. The space of self-referential functional values of transcendental argument is indicated by Kant quite formally. This transparent disposition of the formally coordinated system of cognitive conditions of the synthesis of knowledge and understanding have caused the insufficient acknowledgement of the self-referential character of the transcendental argument, as well as numerous attempts to return to its interpretation according to deductive reasoning.
Publisher

Year
Issue
2
Pages
106-119
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Rudiger Bubner, for postal address contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09UAAAAA068313
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.8cb53b6a-9eb0-3a7f-a785-9a34740d5da0
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