PL EN


Journal
2006 | 14 | 2(54) | 97-109
Article title

TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
A novel analysis of knowledge is offered. The idea is to use the logic of presupposition and replace truth requirement with non-falsity requirement in the tripartite definition of knowledge. This move can be used to explain the difference between outdated knowledge and mere superstition and to solve some problems about the epistemic closure. In this regard, it is claimed that the present offer improves upon Nozick's conditional theory of knowledge and Dretske's relevant alternatives approach. Next, an attempt to elucidate Wittgenstein's and Wisniewski's anti-sceptical strategies is made. Finally, the prospects of avoiding circularities in reliabilism are indicated.
Journal
Year
Volume
14
Issue
Pages
97-109
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • A. Grobler, Uniwersytet Opolski, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, ul. Plebiscytowa 5, 45-359 Opole, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06PLAAAA01553415
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.8dcdfa1c-ab39-3a5d-a7d9-aa156757d89a
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