PL EN


2010 | 6 | 88-102
Article title

GENERAL APTITUDE AND THE ASSUMPTION OF TRUTH IN DEDUCTIVELY RATIONAL REASONING ABOUT PROBABLE BUT FALSE ANTECEDENT TO CONSEQUENT RELATIONS

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Two experiments (N1 = 117 and N2 = 245) on reasoning with knowledge-rich conditionals showed a main effect of logical validity, which was due to the negative effect of counter-examples being smaller for valid than for invalid arguments. These findings support the thesis that some people tend to inhibit background inconsistent with the hypothetical truth of the premises, while others tend to abandon the implicit truth-assumption when they have factual evidence to the contrary. Findings show that adhering to the truth-assumption in the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary requires an investment of time and effort which people with a higher general aptitude are more likely to do.
Keywords
Contributors
author
  • Walter Schroyens, Independent Senior R esearch Fellow, Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Tiensestraat 102, B-1000 LEUVEN
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11PLAAAA090715
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.90993c84-3171-34d2-b186-39467ac79b04
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