PL EN


Journal
2009 | 19 | 2 | 223-232
Article title

COVARIANT REALISM

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Hermeneutic phenomenology of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the theory (as elements in a theoretical 'language'), and in relation to the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as 'fulfilled' in laboratory situations that 'produce' worldly objects. The question then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied when the mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev's proposal to avoid this involves the concept of 'inscription.' This paper proposes another approach, 'covariant realism', which draws from Heidegger's notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored.
Contributors
author
  • Robert Crease, Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University, 213 Harriman Hall Stony Brook, NY 11794-3750, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10SKAAAA07601
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.90cf6986-310a-32cd-b467-e02ad538a445
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.