PL EN


2007 | 55 | 6 | 879-897
Article title

Socialismus, esencialismus a externalismus

Authors
Title variants
EN
Socialism, essentialism and externalism
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
The paper defends two assumptions in Burge's externalist argument against materialism. One assumption is that the content of a belief is determined by the rules that govern its expression in a shared language. Hence, I call this principle linguistic socialism. According to the other assumption, a belief survives as long as it keeps its content. Content is regarded here as essential to a belief, so I call this principle semantic essentialism. The critics of socialism such as Davidson and Bilgrami reject it in favour of individualism, claiming that mental content is independent of conventionally fixed meaning. The opponents of essentialism such as Gibbons prefer accidentalism, arguing that content is inessential to a belief. I argue that individualism and accidentalism contradict empirical facts and modal intuitions about belief ascription, respectively.
Keywords
Year
Volume
55
Issue
6
Pages
879-897
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • T. Hribek, Filosoficky ustav AV CR, Jilska 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08CZAAAA03847678
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9260f965-477f-39e7-90bc-32c2d7b17c8b
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