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2014 | 62 | 1 | 61-76
Article title

Proč jsou elementární věty a stavy věcí v Traktátu vzájemně nezávislé?

Content
Title variants
EN
Why are atomic propositions and states of affairs mutually independent in the "Tractatus"?
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
In this article I attempt to reply to the question of whether, in the framework of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, reasons and arguments are given which might plausibly motivate the claim - made by Wittgenstein himself - that atomic propositions and their correlates (states of affairs) are mutually independent. My first step is to make clear that an answer to this question demands a detailed interpretation of Tractarian objects and, specifically, whether they are only particulars, or properties and relations too. After sketching the evidential support for both interpretations, I incline to a reading that takes properties and relations to be objects. In the context of the narrower and broader conceptions of objects, I then give a detailed analysis of the metaphor “the space of states of affairs” and “logical space”, which I consider to be the principal guide in our understanding the reasons for the independence of states of affairs and thus, more generally, of atomic propositions too.
Year
Volume
62
Issue
1
Pages
61-76
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.94cd3451-d928-4201-b67d-e31f76d4c23b
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