PL EN


2005 | 40 | 63-80
Article title

GETTIERS ARGUMENTS AND THE NATURE OF BELIEFS

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of Edmund L. Gettier's argumentation against adequacy of the classical theory of knowlegde. The critic consists in showing that in both Gettier counterexamples one of two situations takes place: either at least necessary condition specified by the classial definition of knowledge remains unsatisfied (so that the counterargument failed to be valid), or all conditions are satisfied while saying we have to do with knowledge is not counterintuitive. The major step of the argumnetation is to justify a prima facie unacceptable claim that one cannot simultaneously believe that p and that p or q. The analysis is preceded by an attempt to locate the philosophical concept of knowledge in proper contexts of the verb 'to know that' usage in ordinary language.
Year
Issue
40
Pages
63-80
Physical description
Document type
COMMUNICATION
Contributors
author
  • W. WciĆ³rka, ul. Klaudyny 14 m. 166, 01-684 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06PLAAAA00731811
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.95f74061-4702-3118-bae2-7d4ee5daed94
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