PL EN


2008 | 44 | 3-4 | 411-428
Article title

Criticism and the Models of Scientific Rationality

Authors
Selected contents from this journal
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
In the article, the authoress mainly discusses the problem of the relationship between epistemic fallibilism and the form of falsificationism endorsed by Popper and Lakatos. According to Popperian-Lakatosian view, it is demanded that methodological rules of assessment be unified and applicable to every fully articulated theoretical system. At the same time, falsificationism is expected to reflect and specify some of the central ideas of fallibilism. Fallibilism is in turn based on the assumption that each part of science should be put to continuous criticism. In other words, it is required that no element of the discourse be placed beyond the scope of evaluative procedures. However, as the analysis reveals, falsificationism and fallibilism can hardly go together. Whereas fallibilism states the absolute corrigibility of every piece of knowledge, falsificationism presupposes uncritical acceptance of certain statements and may result in dogmatic rejection of some parts of science. As a result, the model of scientific rationality built upon fallibilism must in important respects differ from that based on falsificationism.
Year
Volume
44
Issue
3-4
Pages
411-428
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • A. Michalska, Szkola Nauk Spolecznych IFiS PAN, ul. Nowy Swiat 72 00-330 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA063813
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9a2bb864-6953-3187-b1d0-12b3c1944395
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