PL EN


2007 | 40 | 3-11
Article title

INDUCTION, DEDUCTION AND MAMMOTH TRAILS

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The paper examines various instances of 'inductionism-deductionism' controversion (e.g. Popper vs Vienna Circle or the formulation of Landau's argument against realism as pessimistic meta-induction vs. kind of deduction). The thesis is that the form of logical reconstruction of our reasoning (in every-day life as well as in science or meta-science) as induction or deduction is irrelevant as to the rational evaluation of this reasoning. Thus the inductionism-deductionism controversion is claimed vacuous. Instead of formal logic a sort of evolutionary epistemology is called for adequate account, since - as it is argued for - the degree of sensitivity to counterexamples contradicting our theories and hypotheses is a kind of adaptation to environment.
Contributors
  • M. Talasiewicz, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA02855807
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9cc5e6e8-2afe-35be-8bbd-433ebab380c4
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