PL EN


2014 | 62 | 3 | 323-337
Article title

Evidencia v analytickej filozofii

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Evidence in analytical philosophy
Languages of publication
SK
Abstracts
EN
It is often supposed that linguistic, conceptual and, perhaps, other kinds of intuitions are one of the most important tools used to test theories in analytical philosophy. On this view, intuitions thought to be rich enough to be applicable to all the data the philosopher has used in formulating and testing her theory; but specific enough to enable one to choose between competing theories; and transparent enough to be clearly relevant for the theory. In the light of certain examples from epistemology and philosophy of language, it is claimed here that these requirements are not met. Consequently, evaluation of philosophical theories on the basis of intuitions leads to unreliable and problematic results.
Year
Volume
62
Issue
3
Pages
323-337
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.9dd65f8e-e23c-43a3-8170-3c2f3e1d221c
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