Evidencia v analytickej filozofii

• Authors: Zouhar, Marián

Title variants

EN

Evidence in analytical philosophy

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

It is often supposed that linguistic, conceptual and, perhaps, other kinds of intuitions are one of the most important tools used to test theories in analytical philosophy. On this view, intuitions thought to be rich enough to be applicable to all the data the philosopher has used in formulating and testing her theory; but specific enough to enable one to choose between competing theories; and transparent enough to be clearly relevant for the theory. In the light of certain examples from epistemology and philosophy of language, it is claimed here that these requirements are not met. Consequently, evaluation of philosophical theories on the basis of intuitions leads to unreliable and problematic results.

Keywords

EN

analytical philosophy; intuition; evidence in philosophy; richness of intuitions; specifity of intuitions; transparency of intuitions

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 323-337
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Zouhar, Marián

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic