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2004 | 48 | 4 | 409-443
Article title

The 'Brains in a Vat' - hypothesis and the internal realism

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
HU
Abstracts
EN
This paper investigates Hilary Putnam's famous 'Brains in a vat' hypothesis. In the literature of the problem, it is mostly discussed as an antisceptic hypothesis. It was introduced firstly in 1981 in the book 'Reason, Truth and History'. No doubt it is not self evident at first sight that the real point of the argument is not the refutation of scepticism, but the grounding of the author's own epistemological view. In part he launched an attack on the view he termed 'metaphysical realism', in another part he wanted to ground his own internal realism. The author claims Putnam's argument is imperfect either if we think of his thinking experiment as an antisceptic hypothesis or if in correspondence to the previous approach we investigate it as a review of metaphysical realism. And the last but no less important thing is that it fails to sufficiently support Putnam's own epistemology.
Year
Volume
48
Issue
4
Pages
409-443
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • G. Kertesz, no address given, contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06HUAAAA00872099
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.a1abd09e-bb91-3645-bd02-6cbb8bb52e40
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