PL EN


2004 | 13 | 2(50) | 59-73
Article title

Representationism and Anti-Representationism in Philosophy of Mind

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The author is concerned with the problem of the nature of experience conceived as a perspectival mental picture of the world. The question she raises is: Can we make sense of the representational view, according to which there are no such items subjective, nonrelational qualia, and all mental entities--treated by anti-representationalists as qualia--are nothing but configurations of representations? Her tentative answer is yes. She goes on to argue that the representational view is more promising than the antirepresentationalis approach that highlights the significance of nonrelational qualia.
Contributors
author
  • A. Schetz, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
04PLAAAA000348
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.a29da114-ebb3-358d-a965-a61e16d992f1
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