PL EN


2008 | 17 | 3(67) | 5-19
Article title

Embodied Mind, or the Problem of the Existence of the Soul in the Philosophy of Antonio Damasio

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
According to Antonio Damasio, consciousness and the sense of self consist of several hierarchically structured maps and representations. At the basic level there is a collection of neural patterns (first-order maps) that reflects the state of the organism's internal milieu. Higher mental levels re-represent this differentiation in the higher-order maps. Thus, we can speak of an embodied nature of the mind without denying its reality. To provide a background to Damasio's theory, the author raises the question about methodological frameworks. A comparison between Damasio's empirical theory and the traditional notion of the soul highlights the explanatory weakness of the latter. It pertains especially to the relationships between brain damage and changes of consciousness or the sense of self.
Contributors
author
  • P. Bankiewicz, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krak√≥w, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA064012
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.a3d52bab-4b13-3283-98cd-f49d46b675f5
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