Skepticizmus – rôzne podoby, rôzne problémy

• Authors: Andrej Démuth

Title variants

EN

Scepticism – Various Forms, Various Problems

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

This article focuses on the presentation of the basic forms of scepticism and sceptical argumentation denying the possibility of gaining knowledge in the sense of its tripartite definition (justified true belief). The author presents a selection of historical objections to the attainability and knowability of truth and the possibility of gaining complete or adequate true justification of knowledge, but also objections concentrating on the understanding of knowledge as conscious and fully-reflected true belief. In the second part of the article the author attempts to argue against advocates of the unjustifiability of knowledge (holding that there do not exist any sufficient or partly good reasons for knowledge) by pointing to the existence of various levels of persuasiveness of particular opinions and beliefs and by showing the meaninglessness of the distinction between knowledge and supposition in conceptions that deny knowledge any kind of good reasons. In conclusion there is an attempt to demonstrate that falsification of a certain piece of knowledge is itself a piece of knowledge that is grounded on the adequate reasons of its soundness.

Keywords

EN

scepticism; tropes; supposition; justification; negation

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 705-723
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Andrej Démuth

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic