How facts become norms

• Authors: Marek Káčer
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

I argue that it is possible to derive norms from facts. In this second part of my enterprise I suggest that permanent human behaviour as a matter of fact produces norms as a matter of ought. I proceed to defend this suggestion in two steps. Firstly, I use Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance applied in the particular context of judicial decision-making to demonstrate how our behaviour changes our normative attitudes. Subsequently, I try to prove that normative attitudes which stem from settled inferential practice can be understood as “the genuine ought”. The objectivity of normativity is thus not a matter of reference, but a matter of inference and the meaning of our ought-terms is nothing else but the sum of practical conclusions they usually lead to.

Keywords

EN

cognitive dissonance; frege-geach problem; inferentialism; one right answer thesis

Discipline

• LAW_&_ADMINISTRATION: LAW & ADMINISTRATION

• Publisher: Institute of State and Law, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: The Lawyer Quarterly
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 7
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 1-11
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Marek Káčer

• ---