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2005 | 112 | 4 | 31-46

Article title

The Russian Approach to the Negotiations between Augustus II and Sweden (1720)

Authors

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
A continuation of reflections about the course of the Polish–Swedish negotiations conducted in 1719-1720 (published in 'Kwartalnik Historyczny' 111, 2004, 3, pp. 23–44). The author examined the attitude represented by Russia towards the fact that Augustus II, her heretofore ally, had inaugurated independent peace talks with Sweden. Emphasis has been placed upon the negative reaction of Peter I, caused by an unwillingness to permit the Commonwealth to withdraw from the range of his influence and, at the same time, to realise earlier treaty promises, such as the return of Livonia or the payment of reparations for the Northern War. As a result, St. Petersburg deployed a whole arsenal of diplomatic measures in order to torpedo Saxon-Polish attempts at ending the war independently. The article discusses, i. a. the mechanisms of spreading false information, applied by the Russian embassy in Poland and devised as proof of the faithlessness of Augustus II vis-a-vis Peter and the Poles. The author focused her attention on depicting the role played by the supposed treaty of Dresden signed with Sweden on 7 January 1720 (actually, this was a Swedish project of a preliminary, never confirmed by Augustus II) during the negotiations carried out by Stanislaw Chomentowski, envoy extraordinary to St. Petersburg. The article demonstrates the way in which the Russians used the texts which 'leaked out' of the Swedish chancery to confuse the Polish diplomats, to delay the talks and, finally, to refuse to meet the demands made by the Commonwealth. She portrayed the weakness of Augustus II who, despite vehement dementi and testimonies showing that the charges launched against him were untrue, did not have an opportunity to halt the detrimental campaign pursued within the Commonwealth. The attitude represented by Russia towards Polish-Saxon negotiations with Sweden was indubitably one of the factors which made it impossible for Augustus II to put a formal end to the Northern War, and which considerably weakened his position on the eve of the negotiations held in Nystadt.

Discipline

Year

Volume

112

Issue

4

Pages

31-46

Physical description

Document type

ARTICLE

Contributors

author
  • U. Kosinska, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Historyczny, ul. Krakowskie Przemiescie 26/28, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier
06PLAAAA01583470

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ac11c30f-efa0-3c45-9b9e-8f31c147b7b5
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