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Journal

2006 | 39 | 99-114

Article title

THE (UN)CONSCIOUSNESS OF ANIMALS AND THEIR MORAL STATUS. HOW CAN ONE RECONCILE ETHICS WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Authors

Title variants

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
Philosophers of mind are beginning to take an important part in the debate about the moral status of animals. However, some of the most promising contemporary theories of consciousness imply that animals cannot suffer like human beings. This claim is unacceptable for many scholars concerned about animal welfare. Moreover, it is equally troublesome for those ethicists who take the ability to suffer to be the basis requirement for granting a being moral standing, because their moral institutions seems to contradict the results of cognitive sciences. The author proposes to solve the problem by rejecting the idea of there being a necessary link between possessing moral status and the ability to suffer (understood in the standard way). Also, he presents a proposal for how at least some of the institutions based on empathy may be defended and become useful in the discussion about the moral status of animals.

Contributors

author
  • M. Kittel, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krak√≥w, Poland

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier
08PLAAAA04428552

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ad70a855-5197-3bd8-9f79-919b8b31f000
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