Husserlovo absolutní vědomí

• Authors: Jakub Trnka

Title variants

EN

Husserl’s Absolute Consciousness

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The article focuses on Husserl’s move from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology, and it attempts to explain what that move to transcendentalism means and what it consists in. It is argued that Husserl’s step does not amount to a wilful turn, or a one-off metaphysical decision, but rather to a systematic thinking-through, and deepening, of the original “psychological” position. The focus on the concept of absolute consciousness at the same time attempts to show that Husserl’s transcendentalism is in no way solipsism, but rather that it involves a committing to the absolute claim of demonstrative self-evidence, which Husserl thinks should be the main theme of all theoretical endeavour.

Keywords

EN

Edmund Husserl; phenomenology; absolute consciousness; self-evidence; intuition; constitution; experience

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 45-57
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Jakub Trnka

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic