Russell a novohegeliánství: F. H. Bradley

• Authors: Karel Šebela

Title variants

EN

Russell and Neo-Hegelianism: F. H. Bradley

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

This paper focuses on a relatively controversial topic of Russellian scholarship, that is, on influences of Neo-Hegelianism in the thought of B.Russell. At first glance, Russell stays explicitly in opposition to Hegelianism, but a closer examination may reveal surprising parallels especially with some ideas of F.H. Bradley, the leader of the English Neo-Hegelianism. The paper is based on Bradley’s book The Principles of Logic, about which Russell himself wrote that he carefully read it. I draw mainly on Bradley’s analysis of judgements, which inspired Russell, especially his thesis that all categorical judgements are hypothetical. With the help of links to wider philosophical bases of Bradley’s attitudes, their comparison with Russell and other theories of judgements I want to point out the often hidden philosophical motivation of logical theories.

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 2, Special No: Studie k filosofii Bertranda Rusella
• Pages: 95-107
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Karel Šebela

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic