Internal Realism and Relativism

• Authors: Dziobkowski B.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The paper discusses philosophy of Ludwig Fleck in an attempt to single out and defend three tenets about it: (i.) Fleck is a internal realist, (ii.) Internal realism is a form of relativism, (iii.) Relativism is theoretically untenable. The discussion of Fleck's philosophy leads the author to formulate more general observations. In the first place, he shows that the polemic between Fleck and Bilikiewicz may be viewed as a paradigm of discussion between the internal realist and the metaphysical realist. Subsequently, three versions of relativism are outlined, and the author claims that Fleck was a relativist in all three senses of the term, even though Fleck himself denied it was so. Finally the author traces consequences of the possible identification of internal realism with relativism. This identification can be interpreted as an empirical, a philosophical or a pragmatic stance. Having made this point, he argues that in none of these interpretations relativism is tenable. The claim offers an indirect support to a more objective view of knowledge.

Keywords

EN

FLECK'S LUDWIG PHILOSOPHY; INTERNAL REALISM & RELATIVISM

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2006
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 3(59)
• Pages: 27-46
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Dziobkowski B.

• B. Dziobkowski, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

07PLAAAA02415008