Why Aesthetic Value Judgements Cannot Be Justified

• Authors: Kulka Tomas
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The article is part of a longer argument, the gist of which stands in direct opposition to the claim implied by the article's title. The ambition of that larger whole is to offer a theory of art evaluation together with a theoretical model showing how aesthetic value judgements can be inter-subjectively tested and justified. Here the author therefore plays devil's advocate by citing, strengthening, and inventing arguments against the very possibility of justification or explanation of aesthetic judgements. The reason is his conviction that such arguments have not been fully met. The article is thus intended as a challenge: any theory of art evaluation which assumes, or tries to establish, that some works of art are better than others or that aesthetic judgements are not just statements expressing personal likes and dislikes, should show how such arguments can be demolished.

Keywords

EN

AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT; ANALYTICAL AESTHETICS; APPRECIATION; JUSTIFICATION

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Art History, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 46
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 3-28
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kulka Tomas

• Tomas Kulka, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic; http://dlib.lib.cas.cz/4282/

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09CZAAAA064314