EN
The paper examines questions which are essential for philosophical interpretation of the notion 'philosophical logic' (PhL): How is PhL possible and relevant?What is PhL called? For what scientific and practical reasons did the term 'PhL' become popular? The common usage of the term 'PhL' and the common objections against it. Is PhL a kind of logic? What are the relations between PhL, logic and philosophy? We consider four meaningful interpretations of the term 'PhL': PhL as a collection of logical systems in connection with philosophy; 'PhL' as logic in (of) philosophy; 'PhL' as a philosophy of logic, the latter is the main goal of the second part of this paper. The development of logic is evaluated in respect to the popular conceptions of philosophy of science (Kuhn's concept of scientific revolutions and Lacatos' concept of proliferation connected to the problem of monism and pluralism in logic). We also survey two different revolutions in modern logic: a transition from traditional to classical logic and a transition from classical to non-classical logic. The reason for both revolutions was that the development of practical applications of logic has gone ahead in relation to logical theory. We propose the idea of 'logical neofundamentalism', concerning the problem of the universality of logic and classifications of logical systems.