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2013 | 61 | 5 | 643-680
Article title

Istoty a skeptický problém

Content
Title variants
EN
Certainties and the sceptical problem
Languages of publication
SK
Abstracts
EN
The aim of the article is to develop the dialectics and potential of a specific philosophical approach to the problem of epistemological scepticism: Wittgenstein’s ideas about the function of fundamental certainties in our epistemic practices. I begin with an excursion into the problematic of sceptical arguments and explain G. E. Moore’s anti-sceptical strategy, which influenced Wittgenstein’s thoughts in On Certainty. I then offer a reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian approach that I favour. On this basis I argue that although there is a grain of truth in scepticism, the idea of an indefinitely-iterated doubt and request for reasons (driving the Pyrrhonian-style of scepticism), as well as the idea of a hyperbolic doubt (driving Cartesian-style scepticism), are philosophical illusions from the perspective of the rules and standards of our epistemic operating - the would-be sceptic offers us no compelling alternative.
Keywords
Year
Volume
61
Issue
5
Pages
643-680
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.b92fdcb7-b5be-4ce8-aad7-6f7cf7519a88
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