Russellův neutrální monismus a problém vědomí

• Authors: Jakub Mihálik

Title variants

EN

Russell’s Neutral Monism and the Problem of Consciousness

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

“Neutral monism”, a view of the relation between the mental and the physical held among others by Bertrand Russell, was by many of its proponents seen as a more plausible alternative to both idealism and dualism. According to a common objection, however, neutral monism implies that all reality is ultimately of a mental – rather than neutral – nature, and so the position really amounts to a form of panpsychism, idealism or phenomenalism. I argue that – at least when it comes to an influential formulation of neutral monism expressed in Russell’s 1927 book The Analysis of Matter – we have reasons to resist this mentalist suspicion since it presupposes a concept of consciousness which Russell would presumably reject.

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 2, Special No: Studie k filosofii Bertranda Rusella
• Pages: 189-204
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Jakub Mihálik

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic