Searlovo pojetí problému svobodné vůle

• Authors: Vojtěch Janů

Title variants

EN

Searle’s Conception of the Problem of Free-will

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The main aim of this article is to analyse Searle’s conception of free-will in view of the objections which have brought against it. First of all, the problem of free-will is defined as a controversy between determinism and libertarianism. Compatibilism is rejected as unenlightening. Next, biological naturalism is presented as the basis of the problem of free-will in Searle’s thought, and the psychological and neurobiological levels of the problem are delineated. In the light of this, several objections to Searle’s approach are discussed. Because Searle sees a possible solution to the problem being provided by quantum mechanics, the last part is devoted to Searle’s understanding of science, and his position is compared with quantum theory (as it is outlined by Harry Stapp). In the course of this comparison a new fundamental question emerges which can be defined in the spirit of the psycho-physical problem, and which must be answered before the problem of free will can be successfully tackled. It is demonstrated that, in the light of the current state of knowledge, none of the objections levelled at Searle’s conception of free-will is fatal to it. The solution of this question is, at this moment, dependent on the future development of science.

Keywords

EN

biological naturalism; determinism; John R. Searle; libertarianism; the problem of free-will

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 65
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 15-33
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Vojtěch Janů

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic