The article presents three main elements of Williams' epistemology: the concept of knowledge, the problem of skepticism and the concept of truth. Williams takes knowledge not as pure descriptive but partly normative concept (to know is to be engaged and entitled). He rejects the demonstrative conception of knowledge (knowledge is infallible) and prefers the fallibilist conception of knowledge (knowledge is uncertain and fallible). Williams is good at bringing skeptical presuppositions to light: the demonstrative conception of knowledge and the conception of justification with Prior Grounding Requirement, epistemological realism and priority for internal knowledge. He rightly observes that when we change that presuppositions (skeptic's context), knowledge does exist. However, Williams-fallibilist is close to a skeptic: they both agree that our beliefs are uncertain. The difference is only whether some of our beliefs deserve to be called knowledge. The most important worries concern Williams' concept of truth (deflationary pragmatism). According to Williams truth has no nature and it is not a goal of inquiry. However, if truth is not a goal, we can hardly understand the previous discussion with skepticism and the defense of rationality.
R. Zieminska, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowska 71, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland
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